Commercial vessels anchor off Yemen's coast at Bab al-Mandab earlier this month. Houthi rebels have threatened to target Saudi ships attempting to pass through the strait.-/AFP/Getty Images
Dennis Horak was Canada’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen from 2015 to 2018 and chargé d’affaires in Iran from 2009 to 2012.
The war in Iran was not a conflict Saudi Arabia wanted – but now it is being forced to deal with the consequences of decisions taken in Washington and Tehran. Long-established regional dynamics and assumptions are being upended, and the Saudis will have to navigate their way forward carefully.
The most significant outcome of the war will be Iran’s demonstrated ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. It is now a strategic asset for Tehran, and they will use it as leverage in dealing with their neighbours and the wider world.
The Saudis and others will look to diversify their shipping options to reduce dependence on an Iran-controlled Strait, but it won’t be easy. Building new pipelines bypassing it takes time. And while Riyadh does have options in getting its oil to market – throughout this war, for instance, the Saudis have expanded the use of their East-West pipeline to the Red Sea – that option may not be sustainable. Iran-backed Iraqi militias proved as much when they attacked the pipeline earlier this month, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, no doubt inspired by what their Iranian mentors have done elsewhere, are moving closer to being able to control shipping out of the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
Additionally, the Saudi war with the Houthis has reignited. Houthi missiles and drones have been launched into Saudi Arabia, and they have threatened to target Saudi ships attempting to pass through Bab al-Mandab.
World leaders gather for annual UN meeting to discuss wars, AI and climate shocks
The Saudis have looked to Washington for help in dealing with the new threat, but have reportedly been rebuffed. The U.S.’s reluctance to get involved comes on the heels of the Trump administration’s decision not to consult with the Saudis prior to the start of the Iran war, even though it was clear that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states would bear the brunt of any Iranian retaliation. This apparent indifference to Saudi needs will have raised Riyadh’s doubts about the effectiveness and value of its security partnership with the U.S. going forward.
These tensions also play well into the hands of Iran, which has long aimed to have U.S. forces leave the Gulf. Tehran’s targeting of U.S. bases and other assets in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere has reinforced its message that hosting U.S. forces may be more trouble than it’s worth, especially if the U.S. is unable or (as seems to be the case with Yemen) unwilling to provide adequate defensive support.
The Saudis have already taken steps to diversify their security partners; the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed in August with Turkey and Pakistan reflected this new reality. However, the treaty’s collective security guarantee modelled on NATO’s Article 5 (that an attack against one is seen as an attack against all) seems to have fallen at its first challenge given the limited assistance provided to Riyadh by its new allies in response to the recent Houthi attacks. That will not go unnoticed.
From a broader perspective, the Iran war has also shaken confidence in the Gulf’s reputation as an island of relative stability in a Middle East habitually wracked by conflict. For a country like Saudi Arabia looking to attract international investment for its Vision 2030 economic reform program, that could be a problem.
Mark Entwistle: How much longer can the U.S. justify its campaign against Cuba?
Looking forward, Saudi Arabia will face some tough questions and choices. What will the relationship with the U.S. look like? Can Washington be trusted? Is continuing the security partnership even up to the Saudis, given rumblings that the U.S. may pull back from the region entirely once this war is over? And if not the U.S., then who? It’s hard to see anyone else providing the kind of security guarantees Riyadh had enjoyed from Washington until now.
Riyadh’s practice of just throwing money at its problems may not be enough this time. Reputations are not easily rebuilt, and partners are not easy to replace. Security will remain top of mind, no matter how this war ends, and while Iran has taken a beating, it will emerge from it emboldened; after all, it faced down its worst-case security scenario and survived. And the regime’s determination to be the dominant regional power has likely only been enhanced by this war. They now have more leverage, and the war has laid bare Saudi vulnerabilities.
The future will demand some kind of accommodation between Tehran and Riyadh. The two were already headed down this road before the war. The biggest question is whether the Saudis can live with the kind of terms for détente that the harder-line Iranian leadership will demand.